

	nase 1)
The Incident Commander and Team members adopt scene.	ed appropriate levels of PPE when approaching the 5
The Incident Commander or Team members entered	the risk area with minor PPE deficiencies.
The Incident Commander or Team members entered deficiencies.	the risk area with multiple or significant PPE 0
Appropriate controls were implemented to protect t	he scene and respond to the potential fire risk.
Appropriate controls were implemented to protect to Deficiencies in control measures impacted on-scene risks.	safety, exposing the working area to unnecessary 2
No scene controls were implemented, leaving the w	orking area unprotected. 0
	ons, prioritised actions and prevented unauthorised 5
The Incident Commander's instructions were delayed	d or unclear and needed clarification.
Team members self-deployed or ignored instruction	s and entered the risk area without approval. 0
The Incident Commander and Teams approached the delay. Team members only entered when authorised	e risk area and were controlled, safe, and without d, and immediate risks were identified and mitigated.
delay. Team members only entered when authorised	ed them to minor hazards or was delayed.
The Incident Commander or Teams approach was ur	nsafe, overlooking significant hazards.
The Incident Commander performed a complete sur hazards.	vey without delay, identifying all the immediate 5
hazards.  The Incident Commander performed a mechanical/a there were delays or an incomplete 360 visualisation	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
இ The Incident Commander's assessment was poorly e	xecuted, overlooking significant hazards. 0
Within the context situation, information was obtain their level of consciousness within timeframes that we have the context situation.	ed about the number of patients, their position, and vere not detrimental to their health or welfare.
their level of consciousness within timeframes that we have been supported by their level of consciousness within timeframes that we have been supported by their level of consciousness within timeframes that we have been supported by their level of consciousness within timeframes that we have been supported by their level of consciousness within timeframes that we have been supported by their level of consciousness within timeframes that we have been supported by their level of consciousness within timeframes that we have been supported by their level of consciousness within timeframes that we have been supported by their level of consciousness within timeframes that we have been supported by the supported by t	ition, and their level of consciousness was obtained 2
Critical information about the number of patients, the overlooked, causing detriment to the patient's healt's	·
The patient(s) level of entrapment was correctly idea extrication.	ntified, preventing delays in planning and patient(s) 5
The patient(s) level of entrapment was correctly identified patient(s) extrication.	ntified, but with delays that impacted planning and 2
The patient(s) level of entrapment was not identified an impact on the patient's welfare.	d, resulting in significant delays, a change to plans and 0

	8. Vehicle survey	OTHER vehicles were subject to a complete interior survey; assessed for impactive hazards. Vehicle data sheets were used if accessible. The luggage compartment was checked, and vehicle batteries were disconnected subject to the need to operate electrical items and accessibility. All hazards were identified, and risks were removed, isolated or mitigated.	5
		All vehicles were assessed, minor hazards were overlooked, or the level of risk was not adequately reduced.	2
		Not all vehicles were assessed, significant hazards were overlooked, or the level of risk was not reduced.	0
vey(s)	the	The Incident Commander identified access points to the patients(s) and considered egress options for responders.	5
Vehicle Survey(s)	9. Access to the Patient(s)	Access points were identified, but with slight delays or less impactive options were available.	2
Veľ	9. A. P	There were significant delays in gaining access to the patient, impacting their health and welfare	0
	space	Initial space was created, maximising access and room for the Medic to provide patient care. Space was appropriately adapted to support extrication pathways and minimise manual handling risk.	5
	10.Interior space	Minimum initial space was created to support access and room for the Medic. Space was partially adapted to support extrication pathways and minimise manual handling risk.	2
	10.1	Insufficient or no interior space was created, impacting access, patient care and extrication pathways.	0
	ident ports the cenario.	The Incident Commander declared the scene safe when appropriate and shared relevant information that was identified during the scene survey.	5
S	12. Identification and 11. The Incident management of initial Commander reports the priorities status of the scenario.	The Incident Commander declared the scene safe and shared information, but the information had to be clarified or excluded minor points.	2
Initial Priorities		The Incident Commander failed to declare the scene safe or did not share critical information.	0
Initial		The Incident Commander identified and managed all initial priorities logically, gaining access to the patient quickly and safely.	5
		The Incident Commander identified and managed all initial priorities, but out-of-sequence or unnecessary actions delayed access to the patient.	2
	12. Ide manage	The Incident Commander overlooked key priorities, or there were significant delays or actions were unsafe.	0
	edic	During the initial approach, the Incident Commander maintained effective two-way communication with the Medic.	5
	13. With Medic	Communication with Medic needed to be clarified or more bi-directional.	2
nication	13.	Communication with the Medic was limited.	0
Communicatior	14. With Technical team	During the initial approach, the Incident Commander maintains effective two-way communication with the Technical team.	5
		Communication with the Technical team needed to be clarified or more bi-directional.	2
	14. V	Communication with the Technical team was limited.	0

		Plans (Phase 2)	
		The IC contacts and agrees on plan(s) with the Medic once the primary assessment has been performed and without delay	15
	ר Medic	Communication with Medic was without primary information about patient(s) Communication with Medic was without primary information about patient(s) conditions, impacting planning decision	10
	15. With Medic	Communication with the Medic was delayed or incomplete, impacting planning and progress.	5
		The IC does not consider information from the Medic in order to decide the plan(s)	0
	Œ	Risk and Patient(s) information was exchanged to provide a shared situational awareness. The patient's clinical needs, condition, extrication pathways, and plans were discussed. Technicians have the opportunity to provide input into the extrication plan(s).	15
ınication	16. With Technical Team	Risk and Patient(s) information was exchanged to improve situational awareness but with slight delays. The patient's clinical needs, condition, extrication pathways, and plans were partially discussed. Technicians provide input into the extrication plan(s).	10
Plan(s) Communication	5. With Tec	Risk and Patient(s) information was partially exchanged to improve situational awareness. The patient's clinical needs, condition, extrication pathways, and plan(s) were partially discussed. Technicians do not provide input, or their ideas are very ambitious regarding plan(s).	5
Plan	16.	Minimal or no information was shared, or the Technical team had no planning input due to authoritarian command.	0
	17. Plan(s) communication	The plans were communicated clearly with team members without delays. All planning briefings reflected a patient-centred extrication, considering their welfare and clinical needs.	15
		The plan(s) were communicated clearly with team members with slight delays. All planning briefings reflected a patient-centred extrication, considering their welfare and clinical needs.	10
		The plan(s) were communicated with team members with delays, or the patient(s) clinical needs were not included in the team briefing.	5
		The plan(s) were communicated with team members with significant delays, or planning did not factor in the clinical needs of all patient(s).	0
	18.Appropriate selection of plans	All plans reflected the clinical needs of the patient(s). Consideration was given to Immediate, Emergency and Full plan(s), and they were applied appropriately.	15
		All plans reflected the clinical needs of the patient(s) but did not consider changes in the patient(s) condition, or one of the plan(s) is ambiguous	10
u	priate	Not all plans reflected the clinical needs of the patient(s), or other options were more viable.	5
Plan(s) Selection	18.Approp	Plans did not reflect the needs of the patient(s).	0
	19. Planning objectives and priorities	Planning and priorities reflected the triage of the patients, and clear objectives were identified, exchanged and understood.	15
		Planning and priorities reflected the triage of the patient(s), and clear objectives were identified, and exchanged but confirmation of understanding was not confirmed.	10
	9. Planr	Planning reflects the triage of patient(s), but priorities or objectives were unclear.	5
	15	Planning did not reflect the triage of patient(s), or priorities or objectives were not provided.	0

	20. Planning takes into consideration the vehicle type.	Planning considered the functionality of seats, safety systems, glass, vehicle type, and body construction.	15
		Planning considered the functionality of seats, safety systems, glass, vehicle type, and body construction with minor omissions.	10
		Planning considered the functionality of seats, safety systems, glass, vehicle type, and body construction with moderate omissions.	5
		Planning overlooked vehicle components that had a detrimental impact on extrication pathways.	0
	<ol> <li>Planning considers patients and resources.</li> </ol>	Planning considered the available resources, number of casualties, level of entrapment, injuries, triage, casualty size and physical needs.	15
Plan(s) Consideration		Planning overlooked minor details that led to slight delays in the extrication of patients.	10
	ing considers resources.	Planning overlooked essential details that led to extensive delays in the extrication of patients.	5
Pk	21. Plann	Planning did not consider critical factors that led to the implementation of alternative plan(s), caused delays and had a negative impact on the patient(s).	0
	22. Impact on patient	Plan(s) were patient-focused and provided pathways that minimised the impact on the patient(s) condition and injuries. The space created was ample for the patient's and team's needs.  Consideration was given to the need for immediate or rapid extrication.	15
		Plan(s) were patient-focused and provided pathways that minimised the impact on the patient(s) condition and injuries. The space created was adequate but could be improved. Consideration was given to the need for immediate or rapid extrication.	10
		The execution of the plan(s) was not fully focused on the patient's condition and could have resulted in some injury to the patient due to the limited space created.	5
		Plans were not patient-centred, with actions detrimental to their health and well-being.	0
	23. Plan(s) progression	Activities were coordinated, logical and simultaneous. Potential issues were considered and acted on, preventing delays. Plans were reviewed and updated if required.	20
		Activities were coordinated, logical and simultaneous. Potential issues were considered and acted on but with minor delays. Plans were reviewed and updated if required.	10
trication		Activities were coordinated, logical and simultaneous; some sporadic simultaneous activities. Plans were not reviewed and updated when needed with slight discrepancies. Unforeseen or slow corrections created minor delays.	5
and E.		Activities were uncoordinated, out of sequence or protracted. Delays were created by indecision by the Incident Commander.	0
Plan(s) Progression and Extrication	24. Patient(s) extrication	The final creation of the space is of adequate size to accommodate removal of the patient. Adequate protection was provided, and the extraction method is performed without sudden movements. Patient in a safe place outside the vehicle	20
		The final space creation was adequate, with some difficulties during the extrication process. Suitable protection was provided, but with minor failures, the extrication method reflected the patient's injuries/condition.	10
		The final creation of the space was not adequate, with adverse movements to the patient during the extraction process. Adequate protection was not provided during extraction. Precipitous extraction or board going into the vehicle.	5
	2	The final creation of the space was inadequate or has not been completed. The board does not go into the vehicle; therefore, the extraction does not start.	0

		Command and Control (During the Process)	
	O L	The scene was reassessed throughout; all hazards were identified and reported, risks were considered,	_
	25. Dynamic Risk Assessment	and controls were implemented without delays.	5
	Dyna Risk essm	The scene was reassessed throughout; not all hazards were identified or reported, or controls were	2
	5. E F	implemented with delays.	2
	2	The scene was not reassessed, or controls were not introduced to mitigate significant risks.	0
	ng	The Incident Commander maintained good positioning throughout the incident. The Commander is	5
	oni	always in the best position to control all major actions.	5
	ositi	The Incident Commanders' positioning was intermittent.	2
	26. Positioning	The incluent commanders positioning was intermittent.	
2	26	The Incident Commander's positioning was inadequate or inappropriate.	0
ont	÷ ₽	Incident Commander ensured that all technical actions were completed without delay, supported the	5
o u	ol o s ar	objectives of the extrication plans and were completed safely, systematically and efficiently.	J
ctio	Contro niques tools	There were some minor delays to technical actions, with some deviation from the plan's objectives, or	2
d A	27. Control of techniques and tools	there were slight issues with safety or simultaneous actions.	
an s	27. tech	There were delays to technical actions, with deviation from the plan's objectives, or there were significant	0
ning		issues with safety or simultaneous actions	
Positioning and Action Control		The Incident Commander controlled the momentum of operations and maintained the appropriate	5
Posi	trol tur	speed, ensuring continuous progression.	
	Con	The Incident Commander was inconsistent in controlling the momentum and speed, which impacted	2
	28. Control momentum	progression.	-
	(7 -	The Incident Commander allowed the Technical Team to dictate the control and pace of operations.	0
	ъ	The Incident Commander had everall command and central of the cituation throughout the receive (the	
	au	The Incident Commander had overall command and control of the situation throughout the rescue (the Incident Commander conveyed authority, security and confidence in their work).	5
	anc rol	incluent commander conveyed authority, security and community in their work).	
	29. Command and Control	The Incident Commander lost command and control of the scene situation occasionally.	2
		The Incident Commander lost command and control of the scene situation.	0
	ē	The Incident Commander considers hydration, fatigue - including tool rotation, the weight of equipment,	_
	əlfa	vehicle components and working in a confined working environment.	5
	۶	Incident Commander does not act at the appropriate time to rotate tool operations, or the Technical	2
	ean	Team does it on their own Handling of heavy objects was performed with physical hazards.	
	30. Team welfare	Incident Commander did not consider the welfare of the Technical team; with minimal team rotation, or	0
		heavy objects (guardrails, tree trunks, etc.) lifted with little thought to the operator.	U
	31. PPE control	Incident Commander controlled and promoted the use of PPE throughout without failures or delays	5
	ino:	There were minor failures or delays in the use of PPE or RPE. (respiratory protective equipment)	2
	PE 0		_
	1. P	There were significant failures or delays in the use of PPE or RPE that impacted the safety of team	0
		members or patients.	Ľ
>-	Stabilisations / Lifting	The Incident Commander oversaw lifting operations or stabilisation checks. They were timely and did not	5
Safety	atio 8	impact the patient's welfare.	
Š	abilisat Lifting	The Incident Commander oversaw lifting operations and stabilisation checks. There were slight delays,	2
	stab Li	impact on the patient or they were not completed at a logical time.	
	32. 9	The Incident Commander did not oversee lifting operations or stabilisation checks. There was significant	0
		delays or substantial impact on the patient.	
	trol	Incident Commander created a safe working area and controlled all hazards without delay or failure.	10
	Con	The Incident Commander focused on creating a safe work area and ensured that most scene hazards	
	33. Risk Control	were controlled or there were delays.	5
	3. Ri	·	
	33	The Incident Commander overlooked significant or numerous hazards, failing to introduce controls.	0
	idy safe rk	The work area was tidy and safe throughout the rescue.	5
	34. Tidy and safe work area	The work area was sufficiently tidy and safe but with slight deficiencies.	2
	32 an ,	The work area was chaotic, unsafe or adding unnecessary risk to the working area.	<b>∂</b> Pa{

		Command and Control (During the Process)	
	t is	Incident Commander managed and coordinated all resources. Decisions made promptly and	
Coordination and Support to the Technical Team	nen Irce	efficiently (one step ahead) to ensure maximum use of resources, equipment, procedures.	5
	35. nagem Resour control	The Incident Commander managed and coordinated resources but lost control or made poor	
	35. Management and Resources control	decisions occasionally.	2
		There was no control or coordination of resources.	0
) L	Ę	The Incident Commander motivated and encouraged or calmed down the team all times at the	-
nica	36. Motivation	correct moments, ensuring a positive momentum all the time	5
ech		The Incident Commander motivated and encouraged or calmed down the team sometimes but was	2
T e		not consistent.	2
o th		The Incident Commander did not motivate, calm down or encourage the team	0
rt t	.⊑	The Incident Commander demonstrated full confidence in their team.	5
bbc	m m		3
l Su	Sonfidenc the team	The Incident Commander provided teaching or made some corrections, demonstrating some	2
anc	Son	confidence in the team.	
ion	37. Confidence in the team	The Incident Commander had limited trust in the team, providing excessive teaching or corrections.	0
inat	(1)	The Incident Commander occasionally assisted where needed, and focus was maintained on	
ord	E	activities.	5
ပိ	38. Hands-on	The Incident Commander assisted when necessary but occasionally lost focus, losing control of the	
	dan	scene.	2
	∞ -	The Incident Commander assisted excessively, constantly focused on specific actions, losing vision	
	m	and control of the scene.	0
		Command and Control (During the Intervention)	
	1		
	39. Patient(s) condition	The Incident Commander received (or searched for) sufficient information about the patient's	5
		condition without delays  The Incident Commander receives (or searches for) sufficient information about the patient's	
		condition but with delays.	2
		The Incident Commander was not concerned with receiving (or searching for) information about the	
		patient's condition	0
	40. Warnings	The Incident Commander monitored safety warnings (noises, movements, etc.) to the medic and	
		patient throughout the incident without delays.	5
	/arr	The Task visual teams are a select constrained but some constrained and also and	,
t(s)	. v	The Technical team gave safety warnings, but some were missed or delayed.	2
For the Patient(s)	40	The patient received no warning due to failures in team communication	0
Pa.	ety g	The Incident Commander monitored the patient's safety and well-being, ensuring adequate	5
the	saf	protection throughout the rescue.	Ĵ
For	int's ell-b	The Incident Commander showed some concern for the patient's safety and well-being, with slight	2
	. Patient's safer and well-being	shortcomings or delayed corrections.	
	41. Patient's safety and well-being	The Incident Commander had little concern for the patient's safety and well-being.	0
		The Incident Commander coordinated activities with the Medic to collectively influence actions and	5
		The Incident Commander coordinated activities with the Medic to collectively influence actions and outcomes (initial approach, access, plan selection, patient extrication).	
		The Incident Commander coordinated activities with the Medic to collectively influence actions and	5
		The Incident Commander coordinated activities with the Medic to collectively influence actions and outcomes (initial approach, access, plan selection, patient extrication).  The Incident Commander coordinated sufficiently with the Medic; some were not at the appropriate time.	2
	uo	The Incident Commander coordinated activities with the Medic to collectively influence actions and outcomes (initial approach, access, plan selection, patient extrication).  The Incident Commander coordinated sufficiently with the Medic; some were not at the appropriate	

ge 4 of 5

	3. Cle uctio e tea	Instructions to the team were clear, concise, and personalised, with confirmatory responses without delay.	5
		Instructions were clear but not personalised or with delay.	2
		Instructions were not given by the Incident Commander or were ignored or misunderstood by the team, or there was no confirmatory response.	0
	th team	Communication with the Technical team was always effective and two-way, with appropriate body language and tone.	5
io	44. With hnical te	Communication was adequate, with slight lapses.	2
Communication	44. With Technical team	There was little communication with the Technical team during the rescue or there was not confirmatory response	0
Comm	appropriate time (on the initial approach, a The Incident Commander received informa	The Incident Commander received information about the patient's condition and injuries at the appropriate time (on the initial approach, after primary assessment, followed by regular updates).	5
		The Incident Commander received information about the patient's condition and injuries, but it was incomplete or done at inappropriate or delayed times.	2
	4	No information about the patient's condition or significant injuries was received.	0
	46. With	Communication with the Medic was effective and two-way at all times; it continued throughout to ensure a patient-centred rescue.	5
		Communication with the Medic was adequate, with some minor lapses	2
		There was very little or no communication with the Medic during the rescue.	0

		PHASE 3: EXTRICATION	
		The Incident Commander identified the extrication phase (phase 3) and passed control of patient handling and extrication to the Medic. The Commander remained in overall control of the rescue.	10
lover	<u>~</u> (1)	The Incident Commander identified the extrication phase, but there was confusion about who controlled	_
andov	an:	the extrication or movements.	5
工	47 h:	The Incident Commander did not identify the extrication phase. There was no control of the extrication or	0
		movements, or the extrication phase was not reached.	U